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Abstract–Operations research and optimization
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in healthcare and disease modeling have
received significant attention in the last three
decades. This paper surveys several
perspectives of operations research techniques
in kidney disease, such as graph theory,
queueing theory, Markov chain, and Phase-Type
distribution (PTD). The kidney related problems
include kidney exchange problem, the modeling
of kidney disease progression, kidney
transplantation, and the complex relationship
between Chronic Kidney Disease (gradual loss of
kidney function over time) and Acute Kidney
Injury (sudden episode of kidney failure in a few
hours or a few days). Each section is
summarized by some discussion regarding the
limitation of proposed methods in the literature.
Finally, the paper is concluded by offering some
research direction to fill in the gaps in the
literature.

Keywords: Kidney Disease, Kidney Transformation, Operations Research,
Chronic Kidney Disease, Acute Kidney Injury, Phase-type Distribution,
Queueing Theory, Markov Decision process, Graph Theory.

1 Introduction
From underdeveloped to developed societies, the perfection of healthcare and
medical services are one of the far-reaching goals for governments. How to

decide the best location of medical centers? How to manage the service time
in the emergency division? How to select the best route for ambulances? How
can the medical service cover the target population? These are a few
questions that Operations Research (OR) could provide a solution to tackle.
The applications of OR are far broader than to answer the aforementioned
questions. A useful review of the past researches can quickly be acquainted
with the underlying implementation and numerous methodologies of OR in
healthcare management and medical services. There are some review papers
in this area such as OR techniques (Rais and Viana 2011; Brandeau

t

et al. 2004), queueing theory application (Lakshmi and Iyer 2013), operations
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management (Denton 2013), healthcare policy (Zaric 2013) and data mining
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techniques (Obenshain 2004; Koh et al. 2011; Yoo et al. 2012; Tomar

and Agarwal 2013; Raghupathi 2016; Rojas et al. 2016). However, there is a
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gap in the literature that focuses on a specific disease and discusses the
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details of the models for different challenges connected to that disease.
This paper surveys some selected OR topics that appeared in kidney-related

M

studies. The main objective of the paper is to introduce the models rather than
only a collection of the related literature. The topics on kidney problems in this

ed

paper include the kidney exchange problem, the modeling of kidney disease
progression, kidney transplantation and the complex relationship between

pt

chronic kidney disease (CKD) and acute kidney injury (AKI).
According to the annual report of the American kidney fund in 2015 (American
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Kidney Fund n.d.), kidney disease is the 9th leading reason for death in the
United States. A predicted 31 million Americans (10% of the adult population)

Ac

have CKD, and 9 out of 10 Americans who have stage 3 CKD (moderately
decreased kidney function) do not identify it. CKD is more prevalent among
females than males. Males with CKD are expected 50% more to have their
CKD turn into kidney failure. Moreover, some nationalities are at higher
danger for kidney failure, for example, the risks for African Americans, Native
Americans, and Asians are almost 4, 1.5, and 1.4 times higher than whites
Americans. Hispanics are approximately 1.5 times as expected to be
diagnosed with kidney failure in comparison to non-Hispanics. The first and

second leading causes of kidney failure are diabetes and high blood pressure
(HBP), which make 44% and 28.4% of all current evidence of kidney disease,
respectively. In 2012 diabetes and HBP were the first cause of 239,837 and
159,049 kidney failure patients. An estimated 29.1 million people have
diabetes; 8.1 million of them do not know they have it, and around 70 million
(29%) people have HBP — that is every 1 in 3 American adults.
Approximately 40% of people with diabetes can get CKD.
Kidney diseases are prevalent in the world and often are lethal. Dialysis is a
temporary solution for those waiting for a kidney transplant; however, it is
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expensive, and the quality of life would be low. In addition, only 12% of

patients with dialysis will survive for more than ten years, on average. The

cr

more lasting cure is transplantation. Considering that selling and buying
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organs in most of society are prohibited, it makes supply and demand

mismatch. In the United States, 79000 patients are waiting for a kidney
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transplant, while only in 2008, 4268 patients died during the waiting time.
Besides the higher risk compared to the bid in the kidney transplant market,

M

there are obstacles regarding incompatibility even from patients’ family as a
voluntary live-donor kidney transplant. Medically, compatibility is
circumscribed both by blood type (O, A, B, or AB) and by existing tissue

ed

antibodies. Type O can accept only type O, type A only type O or A, type B
only type O or B, and type AB any donor. However, the percentages of blood

pt

types are not equivalent, and therefore, for some groups with a higher risk for

ce

kidney disease, there is less offer than others.
One of the most severe kidney diseases is AKI. AKI is a sudden failure of

Ac

kidney and happens in people who are already sick and in the hospital. Unlike
CKD, AKI is often reversible if treats quickly. However, AKI patients who
overcome kidney problem in the hospital have a danger of growing CKD and
death (Kerr et al. 2014).
Figure 1 shows the standardized definitions and diagnostic criteria of AKI and
CKD, including functional and structural criteria, staging, burden including
prevalence and annual incidence, and lifetime cumulative incidence. The

measurement indexes are adjusted based on “Glomerular Filtration Rate”
(GFR) 3, “Albumin Excretion Rate” (AER) 4, and “Albumin-to-Creatinine Ratio”
(ACR) criteria 5.
Figure 2 shows the determinants related to the kidney disease progression
process, including death (purple), grades of disease (green), and kidney
disease (blue). Horizontal arrows show the transitions between stages (kidney
outcomes). Solid and dashed arrows are showing kidney disease progression
and remission, respectively. Gray triangles present constant variations in GFR
and kidney loss. The transitions status reveals that if the status of disease is
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monitored weekly, then any change with duration less than or equal to three

months is suspected of being AKI and more than three months to be the CKD.

cr

There is a big challenge in kidney problems for discovering the kidney disease

us

propagation, the relationship between AKI and CKD, and renal healthcare
management, which OR would be a useful tool to employ. OR techniques can



an

answer several vital questions in this area, such as:

How can factors such as diabetes, HBP, family history, race-ethnicity,

M

obesity, age, smoking, history of AKI, and heart disease increase the
risk of kidney disease? How can other health condition (such as rare

ed

disease) cause a problem for kidney and lead to kidney disease?
(Levey et al. 2007; Mallappallil et al. 2014)
How kidney disease is preventable from the medical test and

pt



symptoms? (Snyder and Pendergraph 2005)
What are the causes of kidney failure? How can kidney disease cause

ce



a problem for the rest of the body, such as bone disease and Anemia?

Ac

(Asar et al. 2016)



How can we speed up the evaluation process and find a match for
transplant? (Anderson et al. 2015a)



How can we manage the waiting list and multiple listing for the kidney
transplant? (Alvelos et al. 2019 a)



What is the waiting time for the kidney transplant for each group of
kidneys? (Bandi et al. 2019)

and many other questions. Therefore, considering the tremendous needs for
optimal decision making in kidney problems despite the complexity,
dynamicity, and time management challenges, this study aims to review the
literature which addresses the kidney problems from OR perspective. Among
the reviewed literature, those with novel solutions for modeling kidney
problems are selected for further discussion in this paper.
Kidney’s related problems are classified into two major groups, kidney
disease, and kidney transplant. Kidney transplant topics investigated in the
literature include 1) kidney transplant allocation, 2) survival model for life
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years from transplant (LYFT), 3) waiting list and time management, and 4)

exchange model for paired donations, spousal, and living unrelated donors. In

cr

this paper, we review the kidney exchange model in Section 2, and transplant

us

allocation and queuing models in Section 3. Challenges regarding survival
eliminate this topic in current research.

an

analysis of LYFT mainly studied from statistical inferences, and therefore, we

Unlike the kidney transplant topics, the kidney disease encompasses broader

M

research topics including kidney disease causes and risk factors, disease
types, symptoms, tests, prevention and treatment, kidney failure and several

ed

other topics such as kidney cancer, stone, and infection. The majority of
research look at these phenomena from data science (DS) perspective, and

pt

the application of OR has barely been applied.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
kidney exchange problem and its modeling trough graph theory. The kidney

Ac

transplantation problem is addressed in Section 3. Section 4 surveys
stochastic modeling of kidney disease and transformation CKD to AKI. The
MDP for kidney disease screening and treatment is presented in Section 5.
Finally, we conclude the paper and future research directions in Section 6.

2 Graph Theory and Kidney Exchange Problem
Kidney exchange is a global innovation program that allows patients to swap
willing but incompatible donors. Maximizing the mutual benefit for a given pool

of mismatched sets, measured by the number of possible kidneys, is the goal
of this program (Constantino et al. 2013). There are several motives for
applying the OR techniques in kidney exchange problem. For instance, when
the donor and recipient are incompatible, or when donors do not come with
paired patients and are willing to donate a kidney without asking for one in
return. Such donors are called altruistic donors. Roth et al. (2004) first
described the classic kidney exchange problem from OR perspective.
As shown in Figure 3 for three incompatible pairs ( P1, D1), ( P2, D2) and
( P3, D3) , organizing exchanges between some pairs of patients P and donors
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D is a critical responsibility, especially when an altruistic donor aD is available.
In the simplest case, two patient/donor pairs are matched together, each

cr

donor giving to the other pair’s patient and they make a cycle of length 4.

us

Larger exchange cycles, such as the three patient/donor pairs shown in Fig 4.
To maximize the pair-exchange rate, assume G(V, E) be a directed graph with

an

weighted edges, where vertex V represents a donor/recipient pair, and
weighted edges E means donors and recipients’ compatibility measurement.

M

Consider C and wc denote the set of cycles in the graph with most | V | 1
length, and the weight of cycle c which is equal to the sum of all edge weights

ed

in the cycle, respectively. The decision variable in each cycle is xc,

ce

pt

1 if cycle c is in the center
xc  
otherwise,
0

and the problem is to find a cycle cover of the graph with maximum weight.

Ac

The mathematical formulation is as follow:


max  wc xc , st :  xc  1, v V , xc {0,1}
cC
c:vC



The constraint guarantees that a recipient and donor need one kidney to
exchange, and each V of the graph can be in at most one cycle.
To solve the aforementioned optimization problem, extensive efforts have
been done on kidney exchange problem for descends, mainly focused on

integer programming and stochastic programming. Table 1 summarizes some
highlighted recent works in this domain.
The graph theory model in kidney exchange problem maximizes the number
of possible kidney transplant by finding maximum weight packing of vertexdisjoint cycles and chains for a given weighted digraph with limited length of
cycles L (typically 2  L  5 ) (Lin et al. 2019). The kidney exchange problem is
NP-hard which means that there is not a polynomial time exact algorithm for it
(for the complexity investigation of kidney exchange problem refer to Abraham
et al. (2007); Biro et al. (2009); Huang (2010)). Moreover, the traditional
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economic theory and integer programming view for kidney exchange problem

face systematic inequity in exchange for certain unmatched patients. Recently

cr

Mike and Maroulas (2019) studied inequity within the distribution of kidney

us

allocation among patients and proposed a Hodge cycle algorithm6 for
minimizing allocation disparities.

M

an

2.1 Discussion on Graph Theory and Kidney Exchange
Problem
Advantages: Graph theory contains many well-established properties that can

ed

be used to improve the computational performance of programs dealing with
graphs. Utilizing graph theory benefits of testing compatibility in order to build
the entire kidney pair donation, before making allocation decisions. In

pt

particular, the lack of bias (e.g., due to location, ethnicity, or blood type)

ce

achieved by cycle allocation could shorten wait times for sensitized patients.
Disadvantages: Although, recent advances in graph theory have afforded

Ac

some advantages over traditional methods such that considering correlations
across the network among the nodes. However, it is costly in computation
when it comes to large-scale data. Moreover, the kidney exchange problem
has a dynamical nature, and the abstraction to graphs can show temporal
aspects of information flow among nodes and links. However, these flow
change with time. Therefore, a static graph only could be a system
represented and the prerequisite for building detailed dynamical models. Also,
graph-theoretic methods are data-driven rather than model-driven. Which

means each updated or new data set requires a new graph model. In addition,
graph theory is not problem-free approach, is based on sophisticated
mathematical techniques that require rational choices at various steps of the
analysis. For instance, when there is a need to choose among several
possible strategies to reconstruct the networks, consider the dynamic weight
for nodes, or use a threshold for links or statistical controls, graphs do not
always lead to a convergent or consistent outcome.

3 Queueing Models for Kidney Transplantation
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The kidney transplantation relays upon national kidney allocation policy as a
national plan which manages the list of all the people across the country,

cr

waiting (approximately 3-5 years) for the kidney transplant. This program
ensures that deceased donors’ kidneys are distributed fairly using a

us

transparent system depending on how well you match with the available
kidney and how many donors are available in your local area. The decision for

an

distributing donors’ kidneys is a combination of blood-type and antibody
matching, time with kidney failure, and a few other factors (such as heart

M

disease, not being strong enough to endure an operation, infection, obesity,
smoking or substance abuse) that give people priority on the list (including

ed

being a child or being a past live kidney donor) with giving the propriety to
longer waiting time. The main purpose of this program is to reduce regional

pt

variability in access to transplantation and improve the outcomes for individual

ce

kidneys that are transplanted.

Waiting time includes time spent after starting dialysis prior to being registered

Ac

on the waiting list. Candidates are registered on the waiting list once they
have a GFR value less than or equal to 20 ml/min or have begun dialysis.
The waiting times for solid-organ transplantation is a vital issue which is
studied by Rexius et al. (2002); Danovitch and Cecka (2003); Hussey
et al. (2007); Barone et al. (2008); Stanford et al. (2008); Glander
et al. (2010); Phelan et al. (2010); Liefeldt et al. (2011); Elalouf
et al. (2018); Perlman et al. (2018). Although their observation is inconsistent,

the recipients with blood type O in compared to type A, and A in comparison
to AB wait longer. Also, patients with blood type B are sometimes waiting
slightly longer than O. This problem is known as the blood type O problem
occurring in various organ types with different waiting times as reported in
several studies in the United States (Barone et al. 2008), and Ireland (Phelan
et al. 2010).
Therefore, despite the regulation for kidney transplantation, optimal decision
making can be categorized based on two main problems:

t

Optimal threshold level to accept a transplant (Ahn

ip



and Hornberger (1996): single patient) (Su and Zenios (2004): multiple
Optimally allocating different types of stochastically arriving kidney
(Stanford et al. 2014; Perlman et al. 2018).

us



cr

patients).

an

3.1 Ahn and Hornberger (1996)’s Model

Ahn and Hornberger (1996)’s model offers organ quality-based kidney

M

transplantation, which patients have a choice to accept or reject the kidney.
As shown in Figure 5, they considered five states (with transition probabilities

ed

based on issued graft survival rates 7 of patients in the U.S.): alive on dialysis
waiting for a transplant (s1), alive on dialysis with no option for transplantation

pt

(s2), successful transplant (s3), transplant failed (s4), death (s5), where only at

ce

state s1 patient can decide to accept or reject the kidney.
Their problem focused on finding the minimum threshold level for patient for

Ac

deciding to accept or reject the kidney. They introduced the Quality-Adjusted
Life Year (QALY) index based on patient-specific ratings for being in various
health states. Such that, if the expected 12 months of graft survival rate for
the kidney-patient pair exceeded the threshold, the patient accepted the
transplant; otherwise, the patient rejected it.
To estimate graft survival rate, Gjertson’s logistic-regression model (Gjertson
et al. 1991) is considered with several independent futures including age,

gender, ethnic group, original disease-causing end-stage renal disease
(ESRD), number of transfusions, graft number, highest panel reactive
antibody level, year of transplant, use of cyclosporine to prevent rejection,
center of transplantation, donor relationship (i.e., cadaver versus livingrelated), Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) mismatches, and cold ischemia
time.
Let x be the graft survival rate and d the minimum accepted threshold level.
The decision parameter d can be estimated using one-year graft survival rate.

ip

1-year graft survival rate (x > d) and then either (1) have successful

t

By starting from s1, a patient may accept a donor who provides the minimum
transplantation (QALY3), or (2) have failed transplantation (QALY4). The

cr

patient may not find a donor with a satisfying 1-year graft survival rate (x < d),

us

and may undergo the QALY of dialysis as either (1) qualified for

transplantation (QALY1) or (2) unqualified for transplantation (QALY2), or

an

death ( QALY5  0 ) which mathematically can be represented as:
QALY1    ( xQALY3  (1  x)QALY4 ) f ( x)dx    f ( x)dx( p11QALY1  p12QALY2 )  QOL1 ,
1

d

0

M

d

QALY2 

ed

and respectively QALY2, QALY3 and QALY4 are equal to:
QOL2   p21QALY1
,
1   p22

ce
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 QOL3  (1  x)Imm    p34

1   12 
QALY3  
(QOL3  (1  x)Imm)   12 
QALY4  ,


1   p33
 1  

 1   p33


Ac


 QOL4 
1   6 
QALY4  
QOL4   6   QALY1  (1   ) 
 ,


 1  
1   p44 

where

f(x): probability function of 1-year graft survival for a pool of donors’ kidneys.
QOLi: monthly quality-of-life score assigned to each state, 0  QOLi  1 .
Imm: quality-of-life adjustment for side effects of immunosuppressive drugs.

1   : monthly fixed discount rate (> 0).

pij: monthly transition probability from si to sj, i, j  1,...,5 .
δ: probability of being eligible for re-transplantation 6 months after a failed
transplant
Therefore, the minimum acceptable of 1-year graft survival rate, d, is obtained
by maximization of QALY1.

t

3.2 Su and Zenios (2005)’s Model
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Su and Zenios Su and Zenios (2005) considered the patient choice on kidney

cr

allocation based on sequential stochastic assignment model. When a kidney
offers to a patient, it could be accepted or rejected, and patient can join the

us

candidate queue for future transplantation. Patients accept a kidney offer by

an

maximizing their expected reward.

The following assumptions are considered in their model:

ed

types and the reward functions.

M

(a) The candidates and the donor are equally well informed about kidney

(b) Candidates may discount future rewards using a discount factor   1 ,

pt

while the donor is interested in long-run average rewards.

ce

(c) The reward for a type i patient receiving a kidney x is Ri ( x) , which is

Ac

the same as the reward obtained by the donor.
(d) At the end of the planning horizon, the reward of a patient who has not
received an offer is zero.

To estimate the optimal reward function for each patient, assume m different
type of transplant candidates to be assigned to n different type of kidneys. If a
transplant patient of type i  1,..., m has been assigned to type j  1,..., n
kidney, we get a reward of Rij. For i {1,..., m} , pi is the proportion of type i
patient, and for j {1,..., n} , qj is the relative frequency of type j kidney.

Therefore, partition policy can be shown by aij and the fraction of type j
aij
kidneys assigned to type i candidates is calculated by m
. An optimal
 aij
i 1

partition policy a  {a }
*

m n
ij i 1 j 1

as the first-best policy is a solution of the

following mathematical problem:
m

max aij

n

 a R
ij

m

st :

ij

i 1 j 1

a

ij

 q j , j

a

ij

 pi , i

ip

n

t

i 1
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j 1

Now, consider the situation that patient wants to reject a kidney offer. In order

us

to penalize a patient from rejecting too many organs, if patient type i rejects
kidney type j, he is moved down to the end of the queue, and that kidney is

an

wasted. Assume that patients use a discount factor δ to discount future
values. If patient i reject the kidney j, and accepts the next offer, the second-

n

 a R
ij

a

ij

 q j , j

i 1
k

a

 pi , i

ce

ij

j 1
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m

st :

ij

i 1 j 1

ed

m

max aij

M

best policy under discrete kidney types would be as follow:
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n
n


  n


a
a
R



ij

  j 1 ij ij  
j 1

  n
   0, i, j
aij Rij  
n

 1   (1  a )  

a



ij
ij

 
 
j 1
j 1



The model with patient choice considers the incentive compatibility constraint
and replace the “supply balance demand” constraint by the inequality
constraint.

3.3 Stanford et al. (2014)’s Model

Stanford et al. (2014) proposed a queueing model for stochastically-arriving
kidney allocation to arbitrary transplantation applicants. Their model considers
blood type compatibility. As shown in Figure 6, allowable pairs and rejected
compatible pairs represented by solid and dashed arrows, respectively. Based
on Figure 6, O to AB are not favored medically, B to AB would conduct to
further transfers from O to B, and O to A has disadvantages for candidates O.
The resulting policy allows type O organs to be transplanted into type B
recipients for a small fraction PO, and type A organs to be transplanted into
type AB recipients for another small fraction PA.
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The model of Stanford et al. (2014) presented an idealized transplant queue

model by the most critical criteria in waiting time. Patients are assigned to the

cr

waiting queue for candidates with kidney type i, i  O, A, B, AB based on a

us

renewal process (see Kleinrock (1975)).

Consider Ti as the time between successive placements for First-Come-First-

an

Served (FCFS) patients in single server queue i expressing the type i kidney
patient in the ith queue is as follow:

M

availability. Then, the stationary waiting time distribution function for placing

ed

Fi (t )  Pr{Ti  t}; t  0; i  O, A, B, AB.

They also assumed the cadaveric supply for all kidney types to meet the

ce

pt

demand with GI / M /1 queue stability condition as

Ac

1
   1; i  O, A, B, AB.
i E{Ti }

The consecutive time for availability of the same type of kidney (called sojourn
time) is exponentially distributed with rate μi as:
Pi (w  t )  e i (1r0 )t ; t  0,

where w in GI / M /1 is the arrival time until service completion for the
arbitrarily chosen patient, called waiting times on the “Array of Idealized

Transplant Queues” (AITQ) wait lists. r0  m( i (1  r0 )), 0  r0  1, Wi 
is the average of sojourn time, and m  



x0

1
i (1  r0 )

e xt dFi (t ) is the moment generating

function.
Considering only type O and B queues, applying the Poisson processes’
properties (Conway et al. 2003), the kidney type O is engaged for receivers
with kidney O follows a Poisson process with rate O (1  PO ) , and the kidney
type O’s is available for receivers with kidney B follows a Poisson process

t

with rate O PO .

ip

Moreover, the aggregated process of deceased donor organs available for

cr

type B recipients is a Poisson process at rate B  O PO (see Figure 7). To
times WO and WB, for type O and B kidney

an

WO  (O (1  PO  r0 ))1  WB  (B (1  r0 )  O PO )1,

us

ensure achieving fair access for all recipients, equalize the mean sojourn

where R 

O
.
B

ed

( R  1)(1  rO )
,
2R

pt

PO 

M

which lead to the same probabilities of waiting time for a transplant if:

ce

3.4 Perlman et al. (2018)’s Model
The queueing model of Stanford et al. (2014) assumes allocation of a

Ac

constant portion of kidney O to B with equal expected transplantation
queueing time for B and O. However, this situation is not applicable when only
kidney of type O exists, and there is no type B kidney.
Perlman et al. (2018) modeled this situation with the assumption of allocating
of arriving kidney O to applicant O. They modeled the problem as a dynamic
flexible-resource allocation problem and a queueing performance measure
called “Expected Value of Transplantation” (EVT) for assessing the

completion of kidney transplantation. They modeled the problem by assuming
two Poisson processes for kidney candidate, the properties of their model are
as follows:


Kidney candidate in a queueing system has independent Poisson
processes SO and SB with λO and λB rates.



For each SO and SB process, there is a waitlist QO and QB respectively.



Kidneys resources RO and RB are arriving independently with Poisson
rates μO and μB, respectively.

LO = m, for m  0,1, 2,... , and LB = n, for n  0,1,..., N are the queue

t

length of SO and SB, respectively.

ip



RB is allocated to SB in QB. If QB = 0 the unit will be lost.



RO is allocated to either SB or SO.



SB is correlated to LO and LB. If LB  LO  0 , the RO is missed.

us

cr



an

The system’s steady-state probability is

M

Pn,m  P( LB  n, LO  m), n  0,1,..., N ; m  0,1, 2,...

where wn ,m is the probability of allocating RO to SB in state ( LB  n, LO  m ),

ed

then

ce

For n = 0:

pt

w0,m  0 if LB  0, RO is allocated only to SO

 wn,0  1 if SO  0, RO is allocated to S B  0

m  1
n  1,..., N

Ac

P0,0 (O   B )  P0,1O  P1,0 (O   B )

m  0;


 m  1; P0,m (O   B  O )  P0,m1O  P0,m1O  P1,m w1,m O   B





For 1  n  N  1 :

m  0; Pn,0 (O   B  O   B )  Pn 1,0  A  Pn ,1 (1  wn ,1 )O  Pn 1,0 (O   B )

 m  1; Pn ,m (O   B  O   B )  Pn ,m 1O  Pn 1,m  B  Pn ,m1 (1  wn ,m1 )O 

Pn 1,m ( wn 1,m O   B )


For n = N:

PN ,0 (O  O   B )  PN ,1 (1  wN ,1 )O  PN 1,0  B
m  0;

 m  1; PN ,m ;(O  O   B )  PN ,m1O  PN ,m1 (1  wN ,m1 )O  PN 1,m  B
Figure 8 represents the state transition diagram for kidney transplantation.
By solving the balanced equations, the mean number of SO is E[ LO ] . Then,
the mean sojourn time for SO by applying Little’s law is

E[ LO ]

t

O

ip

E[WO ] 

cr

Proof: Refer to equations 11-14 in Perlman et al. (2018).
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In addition, Perlman et al. (2018) developed a queueing performance

measurement based on “best-fit rule” for HLA issue. Human tissue cells

an

include antigens that are immunologically related to a specific candidate. This
antigen is called HLA system. In their model, a kidney in a particular queue

M

will be delivered to the candidate with the highest HLA match in the waiting
line. The HLA match is operationalized when a kidney appears and is
assigned to QB or QO queue; then, the kidney is transferred to the best fit one,

ed

based on the histocompatibility degree to each candidate with I levels of
tissues, independently of his location in the queue. The incompatible HLA

pt

features between a random applicant and stochastically-arriving kidney can

ce

be considered as a random variable H.
The probability of having i mismatches between a random candidate and

Ac

arriving kidney denoted by fi  P( H  i), i  0,1, 2,..., I , and Fi  P( H  i) ,
where FI = 1. Assume the value of transplantation between a stochastic
candidate and arriving kidney is X, therefore, the life of a transplanted
applicant lives longer than x fixed years, and for H = i mismatches denoted by
I

xi; if i < j, then xi > xj. We have P( X  xi )  P( H  i)  fi , and E[ X ]   fi xi .
i 0

Therefore, the obtained EVT from allocating a kidney based on the best-fit
rule can be calculated through the following theorem.

Theorem:
EVTbest  fit 

B

 B  O

EVTB 


N
N 
O
[ PO,m E[ X (*m) ]   Pn,O E[ X (*m) ]   Pn,mCn,m ]
 B  O m1
n 1
n 1 m 1

where

ip

t

N

EVT

Pn ,·E[ X (*n ) ],

B

n0



P·,m E[ X (*m ) ],

 EVTO 
m0

 Cn ,m  wn E[ X (*n ) ]  (1  wn ) E[ X (*m ) ],
 *
max{ X 1 , X 2 ,..., X n }.
 X ( n ) 

cr

Proof: Refer Perlman et al. (2018) (Equations 7 and 15 can be used for

us

calculation of Pn . and E[ X (*n ) ] ).

an

3.5 Discussion on Queueing Models for Kidney
Transplantation

M

There are many medical and non-medical issues such as ethical (how to get
approval from a donation, equity amongst the various patient), economic (how

ed

to buy8 and stop black-market), and logistical (how to store the organ9, how to
balance supply and demand effectively10) involved in kidney transplantation.
In this section, models which considered medical phenomena (acceptance

pt

rules such as blood matching and tissue matching) and non-medical

ce

phenomena (logistic issues and kidney allocation) for kidney transplantation
are discussed. However, there are more non-medical issues which social

Ac

ethics bring them into account; for instance, considering equity among
different groups of patients in terms of race, age, and gender.
Another non-medical issue is acceptance or rejection of kidney by the patient
based on his/her situation (running a fever, or on vacation). Consider this
issue, the patient is not always available to receive the kidney and his/her
state is dynamic. Although Ahn and Hornberger (1996)’s model provides a
semi-Markov decision process for this situation, however, in their model they

only considered a single patient who facing an infinite stream of kidney offers.
Therefore, studies such as the work of Su and Zenios (2004) on a situation
where there are n patients who face a stream of m ( m  n ) kidneys
sequentially could be more practical in a real setting. With the case of n
patients and m ( m  n ) kidneys, the factor of waiting time comes to
consideration for patients, for instance, sometimes patients do not wait for the
best to match, and they select the semi-best to match regards to the high ask
and bid in the market. Therefore, patients’ decisions are not independent of
each other or better to say the assumption such as time-homogeneous

ip

study does not work in the real application. The case would be more

t

(independent increments) which Su and Zenios (2004) are considered in their

cr

complicated when there are k types of organs (for instance, kidney, liver,

us

Pancreas, etc.)

For optimally allocating arriving kidney for transplantation, almost all models

an

are considered the national pool of donors for the local patients. Therefore, it
is hard to say which method is working better when different benchmark data

M

and national/regional regulations in each country/region come into
consideration. However, the rule of allocation priority was not considered in

ed

most of the studies. A brief description of the allocation rule is that, first the
kidney is offered to an identical blood-type zero-antigen mismatched local
patient, then regionally and then nationally. Then it is offered to a blood-type

pt

compatible zero-antigen mismatched patient using the same geographic

ce

hierarchy. Finally, the kidney is offered to all other blood-type compatible
candidates ranked according to their total number of points of priority around

Ac

the world. Regards this limitation, there is no international waiting list for organ
transplantation, and patients are allowed to register in multiple lists to
increase their chance (Ata et al. 2016). Therefore, giving a rank or score to
local, regional, national, and then worldwide compatible could help for
implementation the optimally allocating kidney transplantation algorithm in
worldwide level.
In addition to the main models for kidney transplantation discussed earlier,
extensive efforts have been done on this area, mainly focused on queueing

models for modeling, patient choice, priority consideration, geographical
aspects, and compatibility issues. Table 2 summarizes some highlighted
works in this domain.

4 Stochastic Modeling of Kidney Disease
Progression
The most critical risk factor for AKI is pre-existing CKD, which increases the
risk of kidney failure 10 times in comparison with the absence of CKD

ip

AKI for the propagation of CKD. Therefore, CKD and AKI are strongly

t

(Eckardt et al. 2013; Chawla et al. 2014). Besides, there is a high risk after
associated. Despite this fact that other risk factors such as age, race or ethnic

cr

group, genetic factors, hypertension, diabetes, and metabolic syndrome are

effecting on the severity of kidney disease, understanding the full implications

us

of risk factors on kidney disease modifiers such as severity of AKI, stage of
CKD, number of episodes, and duration of AKI is essential. Therefore, the

an

acute changes in kidney function that characterize an AKI event can be
modeled by a stationary stochastic process (Asar et al. 2016). However, the

M

long-term effects of AKI remain an open research area.

ed

There are several papers about stochastic modeling of kidney diseases with
hidden Markov model (Luo et al. 2013), Markov process model (Nuijten

pt

et al. 2009; Orlando et al. 2011; Anwar and Mahmoud 2014), Monte Carlo
simulation (Rodina-Theocharaki et al. 2012), Coxian PTD (Donnelly

ce

et al. 2017), and multistate Markov model (Faissol et al. 2009; Green
and Richardson 2002; Jackson et al. 2003; Sweeting et al. 2010; Best

Ac

et al. 2005). Additionally, many modeling methods have been studied for
multiple different states disease progression such as HIV disease (Aalen
et al. 1997), breast cancer (Duffy et al. 1995; CHEN
and PROROK 1983; Chen et al. 1996), Hepatocellular carcinoma (Kay 1986),
Liver cirrhosis (Andersen et al. 1991), and diabetic retinopathy (Marshall
and Jones 1995), periodontal disease progression (Mdala et al. 2014). For
more details on stochastic modeling, one can refer to
He (2014); Fackrell (2009).

Following this section, we introduce the stochastic modeling of CKD
progression and Markovian paradigm of AKI to CKD.

4.1 CKD Modeling
An example of life expectancy and progression process of a CKD patient is
shown in Figure 9 and summarized in Table 3 with five states for the CKD
model which are equivalent to stages G2  G5 in Figure 1. This example
proposes a stochastic model that describes the progression process of CKD
based on GFR to estimate the kidney functionality level and discover the

t

stage of kidney disease, to predict the expected spent time in each stage of

ip

the disease progression and to estimate the life expectancy of a CKD patient.

cr

Figure 9 indicates that at any stage of CKD there is a probability and a

transition that CKD eventuates to the death, although each stage of CKD can

us

gradually transform to the worse stage with absorbing state λ.

an

According to Figure 9, the transition rate matrix of CKD progression
represents the rates of transition from one state to another as V.
0
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It can be noticed that λij is independent of time because CKD process is
homogeneous with respect to time. Consider the probability of being in one of

Ac

the states of the process at the beginning of the treatment as

 (0)  ( 01 ,  02 ,  03 ,  04 ,0) , where the first four are transient states and the last
is absorbing. We can model the CKD process as a discrete-time Markov chain
with the following properties:
1. Stochastic process  X n : n  0,1, 2,... takes values in 0,1, 2,... .
2. Memoryless property:

P( X n1  j | X n  i, X n1  in1 ,..., X 0  i0 )  P( X n1 | X n  i)
Pij  P( X n1  j | X n  i)

3. Transition probabilities: Pij (each transition probability is a function of
the state of health and the treatment):


P

Pij  0,

ij

1

j 0

4. Transition probability matrix: P  [ Pij ]

ip

t

5. Stationary distribution of CKD process
● A finite number of states: Solve explicitly the system of

us

j  0,1,..., n

an

n



 i Pij ,

j


i 0
 n

i  1
 
i 0

cr

equations as:

j  0,1,...

pt

ed





 j   i Pij ,

i 0
 

i  1
 
i 0

M

● An infinite number of states: Guess a solution to recurrence:

ce

In general, we can model this type of process with PTDs. The definition of

Ac

PTD is as follow:

Definition: Consider n + 1 states of a continuous time Markov chain (CTMC),
where n  1 , such that the states 1,..., n are transient states and state 0 is an
absorbing state. The definition of transient and observing states are as
follows:
 Pii  1 transient state

 Pii  1 observing state

Moreover, assume we have an initial starting probability of n + 1 stages with
the vector of probability ( 0 , α) where α0 is a scalar, and α is a 1  n vector.
Therefore, the continuous PTD is the distribution of time from the starting
state to the absorbing state. The PTD process can be represented as a
transition rate matrix Q as,
0
Q 0
S

0
,
S 

t

where S is an n × n matrix and S0   S1 , and 1 represents an n  1 vector with

ip

every element being 1. Hence, X as the time distributed variable until the

cr

process enters to the absorption state is a PTD denoted by PH ( , S ) , with the

us

following properties:
1. The distribution function of X: F ( x)  1  α exp(Sx)1 .

an

2. The density function of X: f ( x)  α exp(Sx)S0 , x  0 .

It is usually assumed the probability of process starting in the

M

absorbing state is zero (i.e.  0  0 ).

ed

3. The moments of the distribution function: E[ X n ]  (1)n n!αS  n 1 .
Previously, PTD application has been used in healthcare

pt

(Aalen 1995; Fackrell 2009). In addition, PTD can model the CKD by

ce

considering creatinine level, body mass index, blood pressure, and other
factors in each stage of disease and developing novel Bayesian regression

Ac

models for progression prediction (Donaghy and Marshall 2006).

4.2 Paradigm of AKI to CKD: A Markov Modeling
Perspective
Many kidney disease investigations presented a confirmation about a
connection between AKI, CKD, and ESRD (see Amdur
et al. (2009); Ozrazgat-Baslanti et al. (2016); Grams et al. (2016)). Moreover,

Kellum and Prowle (2018) discussed the paradigm of AKI and its potential
outcomes for the patient, as shown in Figure 10.
As Figure 11 is illustrated, AKI patients can be healed, be released without
restoration of renal function, or can be died. Additionally, patients who are
seeming relieved, may in the future realize CKD or Cardio-Vascular Disease
(CVD) (dashed lines in Figure 11). Although reports on in-hospital events and
consequences confirm the transformation of AKI to CKD, the pathways
influencing these results are virtually undiscovered. Because of the
extraordinary complexity, not all connections can be displayed for AKI and

ip

t

CKD.

cr

Kerr et al. (2014) proposed a structure of Markov model for AKI to CKD
transition by the seven states. The states are including normal kidney

us

function, AKI, CKD, ESRD -including dialysis, transplant, and no RRT-, and
Death as illustrated in Figure 11. For more specifications on data and

an

investigation, one can refer to Kerr et al. (2014) and Mehta et al. (2007).

M

4.3 Discussion on Stochastic Modeling of Kidney Disease
Advantage: Patients with renal diseases show diversity in disease

ed

progression. Although the factors that affect disease progression are not
apparent, stochastic factors such as modifying genes, environmental factors,

pt

gene expression, and somatic mutations are probably involved. Therefore

ce

stochastic modeling of kidney disease is the best way to show the
propagation and transformation of illness.

Ac

Disadvantage: There is no doubt that stochastic modeling of kidney disease
can explain the probability of AKI propagation to CKD, and CKD
transformation to a higher state or death. However, there is some opinion in
the literature (Rifkin et al. 2012) that observed AKI–CKD associations should
be considered noncausal as long as they are based on epidemiologic or
observational studies. Therefore, to find whether stochastic models are
appropriate for showing a causal relationship between AKI and CKD, some
assumptions are essential.

Firstly, there is an unknown gap when AKI happens before CKD. Investigation
on the distribution of this hidden gap is vital as domain knowledge to estimate
the probability of AKI propagation to CKD.
Secondly, AKI severity or frequency is an essential index in the transformation
of AKI to CKD. Therefore, like CKD modeling, AKI stochastic modeling is
required to explain the change in AKI from stage 1 to 3 (see Figure 1) based
on the degree of severity or frequency.
Thirdly, patients with more severe AKI are sicker. Therefore, the

ip

t

transformation to CKD may cause by other diseases not directly AKI. Hence,

cr

other severe diseases causing CKD should be considered in the model.

Accurate prediction of graft survival rate after kidney transplant is limited by

us

the complexity and heterogeneity of risk factors influencing on kidney disease
such as progression of CKD to AKI. Therefore, stochastic modeling for kidney

an

disease progression can indirectly effects on resource allocation for a kidney

M

transplant.

ed

5 MDP for Kidney disease screening and
treatment
Clinicians are willing to figure out which treatment is beneficial for a patient

pt

who has chronic diseases and cannot be fully recovered but can be treated by
medical screening, surgical treatment, and medication. However, medical

ce

decisions are complicated because of the critical situation in different groups
of patients. For instance, aged people usually have various chronic

Ac

conditions, and medication for one disease may affect their other illnesses.
OR techniques such as MDP are strong mechanisms to examine patient data
and information to manage screening and surgery and medical treatment
choices.
MDP is a mechanism for subsequent stochastic decision making which starts
with a Markov model for disease (including states, transition probabilities,
rewards) and overlays a decision process on the model that defines allowable

“actions” at each period and each state. The MDP’s goal is to find the optimal
action in each state at each period to maximize “rewards” (Alagoz
et al. 2010; Hauskrecht and Fraser 2000; Steimle and Denton 2017; Schaefer
et al. 2005). An optimal solution for MDP involves a decision based on optimal
action as a policy and concerning some reward function at each potential
state and each period of the problem.
For designing MDP for kidney disease modeling, consider the following
assumptions:

t

health status in the state transition diagram before an event has

ip



occurred: st , st  S  {L, M , H ,V , D}  { Low, Medium, High, Very High,


cr

Dead } , as shown in Figure 12.

treatment state (on or off medication): m {0,1} , If m = 0, the patient is

us

not currently on medication, and if m = 1, the patient is currently on the
medication.
if m  0

{I ,W }
action space: a( st ,m )  
{W }

an



if m  1

. For each medication, at each

M

epoch, medication can be initiated (I) or can be delayed (W) for at least
one period. Action at  a( st ,m) denotes the action taken if a patient is in

ed

living state ( st , m) .

pt

Therefore, the optimality equation is

ce



vt ( st , m)  max  R( st , I ), r ( st ,W )    p( s t | st ,W )vt ( s  t , m)  ,
st 1



Ac

where   p( s t | st ,W )vt ( st , m), r ( st ,W ), R( st , I ) , and p( s t | st ,W ) are expected
st 1

future reward with  [0,1) as discount factor, one period reward, discounted
future rewards on treatment starting at age t, and transition probabilities,
respectively (Steimle and Denton 2017).
According to Steimle and Denton (2017) there are three types of decision
making perspectives to obtain the optimal reward. Firstly, patients want to
maximize expected QALYs. From another perspective, the third-party payer

(i.e., insurance company) is willing to minimize the expected costs of
treatment and health services. However, society perspective seeks to
maximize the weighted combination of expected patient rewards for QALYs
minus medical treatment and health services’ expenses. Society’s objective
function includes rewards for QALYs and costs.
Moreover, Van Arendonk et al. (2015) developed a MDP model including five
patient states the waitlist (W), post-transplant with a deceased donor kidney
(TD), post-transplant with a living donor kidney (TL), alive after two graft
failures (GF), or deceased (D) (refer to Figure 1. in Van Arendonk et al. (2015)

ip

t

for more detail in model).
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For more details on MDP for kidney disease screening and treatment, one

can refer to Bellman (1966); Puterman (2014); Bertsekas et al. (1995) and its

us

applications in liver transplantation Alagoz et al. (2007); Batun et al. (2018).

an

5.1 Discussion on MDP for Kidney disease screening and
treatment

M

Advantage: MDP can find optimal solutions to sequential and stochastic
decision problems. The significant advantage of MDP is its flexibility. MDP is

ed

flexible with all classes of problems involving complex, stochastic, and
dynamic decisions. MDP not only provides the consequences of a policy, but

pt

it also guarantees that no better policy exists.

ce

Disadvantage: The main drawback of the MDP model for kidney disease
screening and treatment is that the patient (agent) receives reward r ( st ,W )

Ac

every time that is visited at state st in a clinical center. Thus, in order to
estimate an accurate transition matrix for each state, patients need to visit
medical centers regularly, and their health status should be recorded.
However, in a real scenario, especially when patients are in the early stage of
disease they are not used to visit a doctor regularly. Even, it is possible that a
patient for the first time goes under treatment when is in the high state of
disease progression.

The other limitation of the MDP model is that all the state variables relevant
for decision making are assumed to be observed without noise, while realworld data are always prone to noise. Furthermore, there might be situations
that cannot be detected directly using the medical test, especially when the
disease is at a very early stage. In this case, the state observed by the MDP
is no longer Markovian, and hence, the value of the computed policies will no
longer be accurate.
The last, but the least important issue in kidney disease screening and
treatment using MDP approach is the “curse of dimensionality,” which means

ip

t

that the number of states that must be included in the calculation of the

cr

solution increases exponentially quickly as the size of the problem increases.

us

6 Conclusion

OR techniques have been playing an important role in solving kidney

an

problems for descents. Hereupon, a systematic review of recent advances of
OR techniques for solving kidney problems holds promise for comparing the

M

advantage and limitation of existing models, as has been developed in this
paper. As a conclusion and future research direction, we attempted to have a

ed

broader vision for solving kidney problem from OR perspective. These
problems are barely indicated in literature with analytic context and are known

pt

as critical obligations for kidney specialist. Following we discuss some of the

ce

highlighted topics in this chain.

1. Finding an optimal matching policy for fully dynamic kidney exchange

Ac

is an open problem from both the theoretical and computational points
of view. Because kidney operation frames depend on the ordering, but
the kidney disease usually happens before ordering. However,
researches only investigated on waiting time for “hard to match” groups
(kidney type “B” and “O”). Therefore, the OR techniques can be used to
model and predict the order time.

2. Despite this fact that “a donor does not have an incentive to donate
unless his paired patient receives a kidney”, incentives at the patient or

donor level have not been explored thoroughly in the kidney exchange
literature. In fact, the kidney exchange is included a new variable of
bargaining power, and game-theoretical approaches can simulate this
situation.
3. The case of kidney exchange is also included the logistical issues
when the operational constraints involve assembling the resources to
coordinate and conduct complicated surgical procedures across many
hospitals. This phenomenon is not only for “hard to match” groups but
involved the “easy to match” groups as well. Therefore, new constraints

t

as logistical capabilities are required to be considered for minimizing

ip

the waiting time for the operation.

cr

4. Since kidney allocation policies are often made by a committee rather
than a single expert, it is important to investigate if kidney allocation will

us

be acceptable by a group of experts. Operations methods for opinion
aggregation may be used to facilitate group decision making.

an

5. Adaptation of the theoretical results from kidney problems to models of

M

lung, liver, and multi-organ exchange would also be of practical use.
In additions, there are several operations techniques used in different kidney

ed

researches such as forecasting and data-driven models which are under the
scope of statistical inferences and we are not investigated on them in this
paper. Despite this fact that data-driven models are supporting the foundation

pt

of decision making with OR techniques, in the content of statistical inferences
directions:

ce

and data science approaches, we suggest the following future research

Ac

1. Applying PTD in CKD modeling by considering creatinine level, body
mass index, blood pressure, and other factors in each stage of kidney
disease and developing novel Bayesian regression models for
progression prediction.
2. Developing a framework to consider a more precise analysis of all
diseases derived from kidney problems into the body. In order to study
this, a multiplex network (Lee et al. 2015; Ghariblou et al. 2017; Xu

et al. 2015) for considering a multi-layer analysis of kidney diseases is
required.
3. Developing a model of comorbidity between AKI and CKD with the
latent variable modeling. For comorbidity study of AKI diseases, we
can consider Sepsis-associated AKI, surgery-associated AKI, AKI
associated with renal hypoperfusion, and Nephrotoxic AKI as diseases
in each layer (see Moni and Liò (2014)).
4. Analyzing the correlation between kidney diseases and other human
diseases (as an example, refer to O’Rourke and Safar (2005) for the

t

correlation between aortic stiffening and microvascular disease in brain

ip

and kidney).
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5. Defining and classifying kidney diseases to different domains based on
structure, function, causes, duration, and outcomes according to Levey

us

et al. (2013). kidney diseases are different in comparison to other
diseases because of the silent nature of the kidney (Levey et al. 2013).

an

Therefore, developing such a classification system would help to
identify kidney diseases in human with comorbidity relation to other

M

diseases a list of kidney diseases are available at
http://www.kidney.nyc/types-of-kidney-disease/. Developing a

ed

classification system for kidney diseases based on comorbidity with
other diseases in the human would be vital for treatment and disease

pt

modeling.

ce

There are many factors to be considered in healthcare cost-effectiveness
decision-making (Reddy et al. 2019). OR techniques such as multiple-criteria

Ac

decision analysis (MCDA) are very advantageous in kidney decision-making
problem which decisions can be available from different sources to be
integrated in a structured way. Moreover, MCDA techniques should be
chosen based upon the context, restrictions and risk of the decision problem.
In this study we review some OR related techniques of kidney disease and
healthcare management. However, kidney’s operation system can be used as
bio-inspired optimization algorithm for population-based optimization
approach to assist OR related problems. The approach is called kidney

inspiration algorithm (KIA) and it is reflected some ideas from the structure of
the nephron. For more information, one can refers to Jaddi et al. (2017); Jaddi
and Abdullah (2018); Behmanesh (2016); Taqi and Ali (2017).
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Fig. 2 Kidney disease progression process (Eckardt et al. 2013).
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Fig. 3 From left to right, a 2-way exchange, a 3-way exchange, and a 3-way
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exchange with an altruistic donor; Kidney transfer represented by arrows.

Fig. 4 From left to right, a cycle of 2-way exchange, and a 3-way exchange
in kidney transfer graph.
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Fig. 5 State transition diagram for Ahn and Hornberger’s model

Fig. 6 Kidney compatible pairs and their percentages; dash lines show
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cross-match–incompatible pairs. (Stanford et al. 2014)

Fig. 7 Kidney Transplantation aggregation rate for type O and B kidneys
(Stanford et al. 2014).

Fig. 8 Kidney Transplantation State Transition Diagram (Perlman
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et al. 2018)

Fig. 9 CKD progression process with five stages. G2  G5 are referencing
to the staging formation in Figure 1.
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Fig. 10 Potential patient outcomes following AKI (Kellum and Prowle 2018)
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Fig. 11 AKI to CKD Markov Model (Kerr et al. 2014)
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Fig. 12 State Transition Diagram (Steimle and Denton 2017)
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